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HUSTLE AND FLOW: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
BY DANIEL M. KATZ & DEREK K. STAFFORD

‡

Scholars have long asserted that social structure is an important feature of a
variety of societal institutions. 1 Whether analyzing private or public, non-professional or
professional organizations, the existing literature consistently asserts how social factors
and not necessarily expertise dictate not only directives but also an organization’s
substantive institutional practices. 2 Extrapolating to law giving institutions—most
notably the aggregate outputs of the federal judiciary—we believe social structure, and
the formal and informal interactions between judicial actors, at least in part, charts the
course of doctrinal development. Specifically, if when considering a given legal decision
jurists either formally or informally consider the views of their colleagues then properly
conceptualizing the nature and mapping the path of such “peer effects” would appear to
be a critical task for the public law scholarship. 3
‡
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1
See e.g. Brian Colwell, Deference or Respect? Status Management Practices Among Prison Inmates, 70
Soc. Psych. Q. __ (Dec. 2007 Forthcoming) (analyzing the social structure of a California prison and
determining that social standing among the prisoners derives from interpersonal dynamics); MICHAEL
LOUNSBURY & MARC VENTRESCA, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED (2002); Kenneth
A. Frank, Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within a System: Social Capital Within
and Between Subgroups, 104 Amer. J. Soc. 642 (1998); David Knoke, Networks as Political Glue:
Explaining Public Policy Making in SOCIOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA (WILLIAM J. WILSON ED., 1993);
DAVID KNOKE, POLITICAL NETWORKS: THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); Barry Markovsky, David
Willer & Travis Patton, Power Relations in Exchange Networks, 53 Amer. Soc. Rev. 220 (1988); REID
HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (providing insight into the
role of social influence in jury decision making); Edward O. Laumann, Peter V. Marsden & Joseph
Galaskiewicz, Community-Elite Influence Structures: Extension of a Network Approach, 83 Amer. J. Soc.
594 (1977); ARTHUR STINCHCOMBE, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS (1965); EMILE DURKHEIM,
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893).
2
Of great interest to the study of legal institutions are the early network based studies of the medical
profession and their subsequent extensions. See generally J.S. COLEMAN, E. KATZ & H. MENZEL, MEDICAL
INNOVATION: A DIFFUSION STUDY (1966) (finding the implementation of new medical technology more
closely tracks a network based upon the social connections between doctors than a network based upon
expertise). See also J.S. Coleman, E. Katz & H. Menzel, The Diffusion of an Innovation among
Physicians, 20 Sociometry (1957).
3
A small but growing segment of the public law literature is devoted to such contextual understandings of
judicial decision making. See Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial
Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971-1999, Paper
Presented at the 2003 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (manuscript on file with
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Succinctly stated, if legal outcomes are at least in part socially constituted, then a
descriptive effort designed to characterize the relevant social architecture should
complement the existing public law literature perhaps helping to bridge the divide
between the behavioral, strategic institutionalist and historical institutionalist decision
making theories. 4 Of course, acknowledging a role for “judicial peer effects” does not
itself produce a social scientific approach designed to isolate the social linkages between
jurists. Prior studies relying upon academic ratings 5 or citation counts find institutional
authority alone does not explain the prestige and influence across judges. 6 Instead, this
literature documents great variance in judicial esteem even across judges with equal
formal authority.
Building on the themes of this largely non-supreme court centric scholarship, this
study uses social network analysis to visualize the social structure of the overall federal
judiciary. Although network analysts often rely upon survey data to build the
connections between actors, 7 in the context of the federal judiciary, there is significant
reason to believe that survey based network data would suffer from rampant nonresponse or other systematic biases. Thus, in order to develop a picture of the social
landscape it is necessary to rely upon a proxy measure for social connectivity. We
believe the revealed preferences displayed in the aggregate flow of law clerks between
judges reflect a proxy for social and professional esteem. 8 While not conclusive, the use
of this proxy in a network analysis provides a partial snapshot of the social structure of
the federal judiciary.
This study visualizes the traffic of law clerks over the decade long period of the
“natural” Rehnquist Court (1995-2004). 9 As operationalized herein, judges who share
author) (applying a “social economics approach” to the behavior of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals).
Cameron & Cummings cite a number of studies which “cast considerable doubt on what might be called
the traditional political science approach to decision-making on collegial courts. See e.g. Sean Farhang &
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under
Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 299 (2004); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997); Gerald Gryski, Eleanor Main & William
Dixon, Models of State High Court Decisionmaking in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. of Pol. 143 (1986).
See also Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on
Judging, Paper Presented at the 2007 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (manuscript on
file with the author).
4
For an very brief introduction to some of these approaches see generally Section II (A) infra.
5
See e.g. Gregory A. Calderia, In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court,
10 Pol. Behav. 247 (1988) (describing the literature using subjective evalutations.) See also Rodney Mott,
Judicial Influence, 30 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 295 (1936).
6
See e.g. David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 28 J. Legal Stud. 371 (1999); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E.
Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud.
271 (1998); William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 Marq. L.
Rev. 401 (1996); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 41 (1993).
7
See STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 45-48 (1994) (noting that
the questionnaire is the data collection method “most commonly used (especially when actors are
people)”).
8
For the argument supporting the use of this proxy see Section IIB infra.
9
The “natural Rehnquist court” is typically defined as the period from 1994-2005 where the composition of
judges remained unchanged. To synergize this period with clerk hiring calendar, our data is restricted to
the 1995-2004 time period. For use of the term in another empirical context see e.g. Lori A. Ringhand,
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clerks may be both socially connected and held in high regard within the relevant
community. In other words, the structural prestige derived from the network analysis of
law clerk traffic is not separable into its social and professional components.
Undoubtedly, it is such individuals who maximize in both relevant dimensions who are
most likely to be able to persuade the aggregate institution to support their specific vision
of the law.
The precursor to evaluating the doctrinal consequences that social structure
imposes is an effort to characterize its nature. As there is no “pause button” in the
external environment, reputation effects, esteem, prestige and influence are in a
consistent state of flux. 10 What is needed is a methodology that can capture the richness
of this dynamic landscape. Complexity generally, and network analysis more
specifically, may help harness this dynamism thereby allowing for unique insight into the
role of peer effects in the federal judiciary.
To motivate the use of network analytics, the article begins in Section I with a
description of the science of networks as a subset of the larger field of complexity. 11
With homage to Moreno, Milgram, Grannovetter, Watts and Strogatz as well as others, it
describes how network analysis, 12 the long standing but recently popularized social
science methodology allows for the insightful study of a variety of social systems.
Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24
Const. Comm. __ (2007 Forthcoming).
10
Actors consistently enter and exit the network and thus within the newly constituted social world their
doctrinal legacy may or may not sustain. Although our current effort is not suited to capture the notion of
legacy, even a casual observer would recognize that although many jurist’s views are forgotten the views of
a selected few persist. Federal judges such as Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, Henry Friendly and J. Skelly
Wright as well as State Supreme Court justices such as Cornelius Moynihan, Hans Linde, Roger Traynor
and Stanley Mosk impose distinctive legacies.
11
While certainly not part of the mainstream legal literature, complexity has made important contributions
to the legal scholarship. See e.g. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks
as Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1687 (2005); David G. Post &
Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal
Systems, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 545 (2000) (using fractal structure theory of citation to precedent in judicial
opinions); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: Lending Discrimination Laws as a
Test Case, 12 J.L. & Pol’y 637 (1996) (employing chaos theory to review legislative responses to alleged
lending discrimination); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641
(1996) (discussing legal evolution and invoking both path dependence and systems theory); J. B. Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical
Meaning for Democracy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1996) (discussing both complexity and the general
evolutionary model); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994) (discussing chaos
theory in the context of capital market regulation). For an extensive list of scholarship complied by
Professor J.B. Ruhl see http://law.vanderbilt.edu/seal/resources/readingscomplex.htm
12
Formal network analysis or invocation of its core concepts has recently been witnessed within legal and
public law literature. See e.g. Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth & John P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right:
Networks and Organization, 32 L. & Soc. Inq. 883 (2007); James Fowler, et. al., Network Analysis and the
Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 Political Analysis, 324
(2007); Frank Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme
Court's Network of Precedents, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-67, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924110 ; Frank Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Empirically Testing Dworkin's
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156 (2005); David Walsh, On
the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31
L. & Soc. Rev. 337 (1997).
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In an effort to justify the use of law clerk traffic as a proxy for social connectivity,
Section II of this article reviews two major strains of the extant legal literature. After
briefly introducing the larger public law literature, it demonstrates how insights drawn
from the scholarship on the law clerk market might, in part, help consider the social
structure of the federal judiciary. Concepts such as social influence are fairly difficult to
operationalize and, in response, scholars have developed an array of diverse approaches
to consider such questions.13 We believe that a promising addition to the literature would
be a graph theoretic approach. Specifically, notwithstanding any allocative inefficiencies
present in the judicial law clerk market, it is highly probable that, in the aggregate,
judicial reputation significantly impacts the matching of law clerks with their employers.
Thus, as applied to the marriage of these two literatures, the network analysis advanced
herein relies upon the displayed preferences of both judges and clerks, embedded within
law clerk traffic, to provide a partial picture of the overall social structure.
Section III represents this article’s core contribution. It begins with a description
of the significant data collection effort undertaken to support our findings. Our research
team collected available information for every federal judicial law clerk employed by an
Article III judge 14 during the full term of the “natural” Rehnquist Court (1995-2004).
Holding the United States Supreme Court constant and drawing from a base of nearly
20,000 clerk events, 15 Section III provides a series of network based visualizations of
federal law clerk traffic and then concludes with a characterization of the degree
distribution the judicial social network.
Section IV provides some concluding thoughts about emergence, convergence,
peer effects and legal change in the federal judicial hierarchy. We believe social
structure “matters” for the federal judiciary much like it does for other societal
institutions. Namely, if a given judge appreciating his or her position within the
hierarchical organizations, understands that his or her colleagues might be persuaded to
follow a vision of the law offered by a jurist with greater social importance, than the
social architecture driving such convergence is supreme consequential. Thus, our
emphasis on social structure is a first-order attempt to contextualize the role of such peer
effects for the overall federal judiciary. Although our effort is largely descriptive, the
social structure of network visualized herein provides insight into how the actions of a
series of micro-motivated judicial actors map to the judiciary’s overall macrobehavioral
jurisprudential outputs. 16
I. THE SCIENCE OF NETWORKS: FROM MORENO TO MILGRAM TO WATTS AND STROGATZ
AND BEYOND
Built upon a combination of linear algebra, graph theory and traditional statistical
approaches, network analysis should help illuminate the social structure of the federal
judiciary. Using nodes to represent actors and ties to represent relations between actors,
13

For a discussion of these approaches see Section IIA infra.
As available clerk information for Senior Status Judges is less far extensive, we choose to omit Senior
Status Judges from this study.
15
Hereinafter, a ‘clerk event’ is defined as a given clerk employed for a given year. For example, a clerk
hired for a two year interval constitutes two clerk events. A permanent clerk employed for k years would
have k law clerk events.
16
See generally THOMAS SHELLING, MIRCOMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1973).
14
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network analysis differs from traditional statistical models as it attempts to determine not
only properties of an individual’s relationships to his or her peers but also the larger
social structure in which that individual operates. 17 A brief review of the history and
approaches in complexity generally and more specifically network analysis should
motivate our later move to build a picture of the social landscape using the information
embedded in the clerk market.
A. EMERGENCE IN A BROAD CLASS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS MODELS
Network analysis is a disciplined scientific approach used to understanding the
Although the definition of a
interactions between agents in a complex system. 18
“complex system” is awkward and can seem nebulous, nearly all definitions would
specify that the system must exhibit emergent behavior. 19 Traditionally, systems display
emergence when the micro study of individual actors in a given system yields incomplete
information about the entirety of the organization. 20 Instead, interactions between the
components, at least in part, structure the outputs of the system. 21 As Peter Corning
describes “[A]mong other things, complexity theory gave mathematical legitimacy to the
idea that processes involving the interactions among many parts may be at once
deterministic yet for various reasons unpredictable.” 22 Common examples of emergence
include the study of ecosystems where order emerges from the interspecies interactions.
Emergent systems do not necessarily have logical or deterministic properties. Thus, their
outputs cannot always be deduced or predicted. Consider H2O phase transformations.
Water boils and freezes at very specific temperatures under controlled conditions, but
17

See STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 17-21 (1994).
Drawn from core concepts developed within the academy, a host of recent literature has popularized the
study of network analysis. The devotion of the Ninetieth Aniversary of Forbes Magazine to network
analysis is one of many indications that this is a renassiance period for the science of networks. See
generally Networks, Forbes (May 7, 2007) (devoting its Ninetieth Anniversary Issue to the “New” Age of
Networks). For a non-exhaustive list of recent popular books in the subject See also DUNCAN J. WATTS,
SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS
AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE
NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); MALCOLM GLADWELL THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
19
For more detailed discussion of emergence including applications to a variety of disciplines see generally
David Chalmers, Strong and Weak Emergence in THE RE-EMERGENCE OF EMERGENCE (PHILIP CLAYTON &
PAUL DAVIES, EDS. 2006); Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different
Concepts but Promising When Combined, in Engineering Self Organising Systems: Methodologies and
Applications (Brueckner, S. and Di Marzo Serugendo, G. and Karageorgos, A. and Nagpal, R., eds. 2005);
STEPHEN WOLFRAM , A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002); JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE FROM CHAOS TO
ORDER (1998).
20
See generally Holland supra note 19. De Wolf & Holvoet provide a more detailed working definition of
emergence. They argue “[A] system exhibits emergence when there are coherent emergents at the macrolevel that dynamically arise from the interactions between the parts at the micro-level. Such emergents are
novel w.r.t. the individual parts of the system.” See De Wolf & Holvoet supra note 19 at 3.
21
For an illuminating discussion of emergence and its historical origin see Peter A. Corning, The ReEmergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory, 7 Complexity 18 (2002). See
also BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY (2001);
STEVEN BERLIN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE
(2001). The last decade witnessed the creation of an academic journal devoted to exploring the concepts of
emergence. See generally Emergence available at http://emergence.org/index.html
22
See Corning supra note 20 at 23.
18
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nothing about the change in temperatures affects the actual water molecules. At 100°C
and 0°C precisely the molecules begin to interact differently with one another; and thus,
from liquid, new macro-worlds of solid ice and water vapor emerge. 23 An extensive
study of the chemical characteristics between these moments of transition would not
predict the dramatic transformations that occur at these threshold points. 24 In short, the
whole is different from the sum of its parts.
Automobile traffic is another example of a complex system. To characterize the
global properties of a traffic system, one could code a set of individual level variables,
including the horsepower of the respective vehicles, the disposition of the drivers as well
as a host of decisional rules employed by the driver, such as including the leave space, a
driver’s ideal speed and lane. Even with an understanding of all of these properties, it is
ultimately the interactions between actors that structure outputs for the overall system.
Namely, whether flow or bottleneck will emerge is a function of the intermingling of
individuals, each of whom possess a host of these attributes and decisional rules. It
depends upon exactly which agents are proximate to other individuals.
Returning to the matter of inquiry, the federal judiciary exhibits behavior that
might be considered emergent. While a judge in a given case may rule in isolation of
other judges, in general jurists do not exist in a state of complete social and professional
isolation from their peers. The socialization and training of the legal community occurs
through various repeated interactions with one’s current or future peers at moments and
places throughout the hierarchy. 25 In some cases, social interactions begin in law
school 26 and in others they begin even sooner. Accordingly, if judicial perceptions and
outcomes are at least in part, the by-product of these interactions, then larger
interpretative frames, themselves the aggregation of various individual decisions, are
assuredly emergent. As such, the federal judiciary is a “complex system” and would
benefit from methodologies reserved for the study of complexity.
B. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
One method to study a complex system is network analysis, an approach which
maps the social structure by quantifying the interactions between agents. 27 In the early
23

Id.
In the context of water under standard pressure, these thresholds occur at 32°F and 212°F.
25
See e.g. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPLICATION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC
AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004).
26
See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL (2007). Id. citing Christa McGill, Producing
Lawyers: The Effects of Institutional Hierarchy on the Social Structure of Law Schools, PhD Diss., Duke
Univ. (2002).
27
The origins of network science are closely linked to the development of graph theory. Leonhard Euler,
who major contributions include the first theorem in graph theory, developed his work in an effort to solve
the Konisberg Bridge Problem. In reduced form, the Konigsberg bridge problem asks whether it is possible
to traverse the town of Konigsberg, while both crossing each of its seven bridges only once and closing the
circuit by returning to one’s point of origin. Euler demonstrated this was not possible. With reference to
the Konisberg Bridge problem, mathematicians ask whether “there exists any Eulerian path on the
network.” See MARK NEWMAN, ALBERT-LAZZLO BARABASI & DUNCAN J. WATTS, THE STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 2 (2006). For more on the life and work of Leonhard Euler see C. EDWARD
SANDIFER, THE EARLY MATHEMATICS OF LEONHARD EULER (2007). For more information on graph theory
See e.g. FRANK HARARY, GRAPH THEORY (1999); GARY CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTORY GRAPH THEORY
(1985).
24
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twentieth century, researches such as Jacob Moreno used network analysis to compile
sociograms which diagramed social relationships and identified individuals who held
structural positions that were indicative of leadership. 28 Following this early work,
Stanley Milgram did much to advance the popularity of network analysis. Through his
study of communal relationships in society in the 1960’s, the “small worlds” or “six
degrees of separation” conception entered the popular lexicon. 29 In his experiment,
Milgram sent letters to a sample of people in Kansas and Nebraska and asked the subjects
if they would attempt to send these letters to a stockbroker in Boston, Massachusetts. 30
On average, the letters which reached the target only passed through the hands of 6.5
people, and thus Milgram argued the social world was quite small, with only six degrees
separation between a random selection of people. 31
The logic supporting the original Milgram experiment was fairly straightforward.
If every individual each knows 150 people and each of those 150 people know 150
others, the exponential function exceeds the total population of world before the sixth
order of magnitude. Such a hypothesized network is a random network where the
interrelations between an individual’s second degree friends are not modeled. Mark
Granovetter realized that world’s social connections do not emerge randomly. 32 People
cluster, organize in cliques; thus, if two people are strong friends the likelihood that they
have shared friends is fairly high. 33 This commonality between connections of people in
similar groupings would not allow the macro-network to exhibit the exponential growth
suggested by Milgram’s theory.
Since Milgram’s experiment and subsequent

28

It is hard to understate the contribution of Jacob Moreno to the development of social network analysis.
Along with Kurt Lewin and Fritz Heider, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed dramatic
developments in the science of networks. For example, Moreno developed the “sociogram” an apparatus
that allows social relationship to be drawn using analytic geometry. See JACOB MORENO, WHO SHALL
SURVIVE? (1934). Kurt Lewin extended Moreno’s work arguing the structural properties of social space
could uncovered using a host of mathematical techniques including graph theory, topology and set theory.
See e.g. KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951).
29
See Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 22 Psych. Today 61 (1967). Milgram is often credited
with coining “six degrees of separation.” However, many attribute the term to Hungarian author, Frigyes
Karinthy whose volume of short stories invoked such concepts. See FRIGYES KARINTHY, EVERYTHING IS
DIFFERENT (1929).
30
Milgram, however, did not provide the subjects with address of the stockbroker; he instead insisted
individuals send the letter to someone they thought would be socially closer to the man in Boston.
31
See Jeffery Travers & Stanley Milgram, An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem, 32
Sociometry 425 (1969) (where authors vary the starting populations and “provide a first technical report on
the small world method.”); C. Korte & Stanley Milgram, Acquaintance Networks Between Racial Groups,
15 J. of Personal & Soc. Psych. 101 (1970) (replicating the small world experiment between different racial
groups).
32
Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Amer. J. of Soc. 1360 (1973).
33
Id. Granovetter argued that this empirical fact did not completely undercut widespread interconnectivity
only that widespread societal links are an artifact of one’s weak connections. In his seminal article “The
Strength of Weak Ties,” Grannovetter provided an addendum to Milgram’s theory. Id. See also Mark S.
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 Socio. Theory, 201 (1983).
Granovetter understood that if Person A was close friends with Persons B and C, then Persons B and C
were also likely friends with one another. Accordingly, the stronger the bonds between individuals, the
more likely their first degree nodes are also connected. In network analysis, this is known as balance
theory. See Fritz Heider, Attitudes and Cognitive Organization, 21 J. of Psych. 107 (1946) (asserting in
part the idea of balance). See also Wasserman & Faust supra note 13 at 220-32.
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replications 34 still demonstrated a “small world,” Granovetter worked to develop an
alternative causal account which would sustain the empirical phenomena. He noticed
that the weaker the ties between individuals the more likely those connections would not
coincide. Hence, these weak ties maintained the small-world characteristics observed by
Milgram. Accordingly, Granovetter supplemented Milgram’s by categorizing the
connections between individuals by the strength of those bonds, while also placing more
realistic restraints on Milgram’s random networks.
Following on these themes of prior scholars, the launch of the current study of
network analysis can be traced to the Watts and Strogatz small-world model. 35
Motivated by the organizational behavior of fireflies in Southeast Asia these scholars
demonstrated how a relatively small amount of random wiring can allow a network to
simultaneously hold both small world properties and high clustering. 36 Apparently,
fireflies in this region have the rather unusual habit of flashing in unison. 37 However,
every neurological analysis of the fireflies indicated that they should not have the mental
faculty necessary to coordinate this effort. Although the fireflies may take cues from
their neighbors, this alone was not enough to generate the witnessed behavior. Namely,
in the early evening witnesses commonly observe one firefly light and then another.
Suddenly, groups of fireflies flash. Finally, concentrations of hundreds of fireflies on the
same tree synchronize their flashes in unison.
In the initial moments at dusk when the fireflies are randomly flashing, these
uncoordinated flashes could be considered possible offerings of timing. Think of
applause in an auditorium. Since only one sequence ultimately emerges, it is important to
understand how the landscape moves from divergence to convergence, from randomness
to some sense of relative order. Undoubtedly, the “location” of an offeror is important.
Network analyists use terms such as closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality to
formalize such ideas of structural position. 38
Watts and Strogatz thought network analysis could provide some insight into the
behavior of the fireflies. They used computer programs to simulate the fireflies’ flashing
based upon different rules about how the insects could react to cues from their neighbors.
However, none of the simulations reproduced the flashing in unison. Even with near
immediate reaction time to the fireflies in close proximity, the overall pattern was still too
protracted. Thus, Watts and Strogatz added one more component to their model: they
gave a small proportion of fireflies the ability to see and thus be able to react to a random
firefly. This simulation worked in an egalitarian network because each of the dyads 39 is
relatively equal in its number of connections but with a select few connections across
great distances. This approach reflected a successful replication of the observed

34

See Travers & Milgram, supra note 29; Korte & Milgram supra note 29.
Duncan J. Watts & Stephen Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small World' Networks, 393 Nature 440
(1998).
36
Id.
37
See e.g. STEVEN H. STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER 11-40 (2003).
38
See Wasserman & Faust supra note 13 at 169-220 (1994). For an extensive discussion of the various
measures of centrality see Appendix III.
39
While Mathematicians might provide a more formal definition of dyad involving vectors, tensors and
vector space, it can loosely be considered as two individuals or units considered as a pair.
35
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phenomena and, as constructed, is the biological equivalent to Granovetter’s Strength of
Weak Ties. 40
Extrapolating from the fireflies and returning to the social world, there are many
phenomena that display similar properties. In reduced form, a cascade is essentially
emergent behavior upon which there is enough initial convergence by certain actors to
see it take hold. Cascades are often driven by a small number of structurally important or
prestigious actors. Network analysis is designed to identify such critical actors.
In network analysis, the unit of analysis is the network. The components of the
network are the nodes, also known as actors or agents, and the arcs or edges, which
signify the connections between the agents. In the federal judicial social network, the
nodes are the individual judges and as operationalized infra, the edges reflect a measure
of shared clerks between the jurists. In an undirected network such as the judicial social
network, the connections or arcs have a magnitude but not necessarily a direction. 41
II. DEVELOPING A PROXY FOR THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE: THE PUBLIC LAW AND CLERKS
MARKET LITERATURES
Among the immense public law literature analyzing the operation of the
American Federal Judiciary are two important strands that together with the greater body
of available work, advance our understanding of the operation of this important political
institution. The first line of scholarship considers the relative prestige and influence of
various judges and justices. 42 Specifically, as a variety of commentators note, the views
of some courts and some jurists’ seem to be uniquely privileged while others are not
nearly as well regarded. 43 In order to understand the impact this empirical fact imposes
upon the legal landscape, the literature has been consumed with innovative methods to
help adjudicate these questions of relative esteem.44 However, regardless of the approach
employed, virtually all scholarship finds significant variance across judges on the
question of prestige.
Also under the large umbrella of the judicial politics literature, is a largely
different group of individuals who devote attention to the study of federal law clerks. 45
This “clerks” scholarship includes analysis of the process governing their selection as
well as their impact upon judicial outputs. At first glance, this strain of scholarship might
appear wholly unrelated to the question of relative prestige and influence. However, a
careful review counsels otherwise. There is important information regarding judicial
40

See Granovetter supra note 28.
Our judicial social network based upon clerk traffic, displayed infra, is thorny as the traffic is clearly
directed but we believe the social importance associated with the linkage travel in both directions.
42
See e.g. Montogomery A. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. Legal Stud.
333 (1998); Klein & Morrisore supra note 5; Landes, Lessig & Solimine supra note 5; RICHARD POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL REPUTATION 74-91 (1990).
43
See supra note 42. For a study using an entire court as the unit of analysis see Michael E. Solimine,
Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1331
(2005).
44
Id, at 1350. Professor Solimine provides a very detailed description of the various approaches used
consider the question. Discussing the existing studies he notes “Reputation is a difficult subject to
objectively study. Couple that with the snapshot quality of most of the studies; they usually cover a
relatively short period of time or only samples of the judges who constitute a circuit.” Id.
45
See Section II (B) infra.
41

- 10 Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008

9

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 83 [2008]

reputation embedded within the market for judicial law clerks. Namely, despite any
existing allocative inefficiencies in the clerk market, clerks more or less seek to work for
the most prestigious judges and judges seek the “best” clerks. While not conclusive, we
believe the consistent movement of law clerks provides significant insight into the role of
peer effect in judicial decision making. Later, we will explicitly develop this link—but
first, we provide introduction to both literatures.
A. FROM QUALITATIVE SUPREME COURT STUDIES TO DECISION MAKING THROUGHOUT
THE HIERARCHAL FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Throughout its long history, the judicial politics sub-field has embraced a variety
of substantive questions and methodological approaches. Early work in the subfield
emphasized the decision making of the United States Supreme Court and privileged the
use of qualitative methods. However, these approaches were largely jettisoned as the rise
of behavioralism ushered in the use of quantitative statistical models across a variety of
intellectual domains. Following their prior embrace by allied disciplines such as
economics, within political science, large N empirical approaches were initially adopted
in neighboring sub-fields such as legislative politics 46 and political participation. 47
Public law behavioralism is epitomized by The Attitudinal Model where
Professors Segal and Spaeth derive judicial preferences through attention to the objective
voting behavior of members of the United States Supreme Court. 48 Analyzing aggregate
voting data, attitudinalists argue as Justices vote, they seek to maximize their individual
partisan policy preferences. Thus, in broad stroke their model asserts “Rehnquist votes
the way he does because he is conservative while Marshall votes the way he does because
he is extremely liberal.” 49 While a significant amount of the current scholarship still
embraces behavioral studies of the high court, recent years witnessed the increasing use
of alternative methods as well as the study of other judicial actors. For example, the past

46

In legislative politics, for example, many studies embracing the behavioralist paradigm use outputs, in
this case roll call votes of members of congress to characterize and predict legislative behavior. Suffice to
say, the literature is vast. See e.g. Christopher Achen, Measuring Representation, 66 Amer. J. of Pol. Sci.
(1978); John Jackson & John Kingdon, Ideology, ADA Scores, and Legislative Votes, 80 Amer. J. of Pol.
Sci. 805 (1992); Keith Krehbiel, Where’s the Party?, 23 Brit. J. of Pol. Sci. 235 (1993); RICHARD L. HALL,
PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS (1996); Keith T. Poole & R. S. Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the
U.S. Congress, 1959-1980, 79 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 373 (1985).
47
See e.g. ANGUS CAMPBELL, ET.AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972); RAY E. WOLFINGER
& STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980); Paul Abramson & John Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral
Participation in America, 76 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 502 (1982).
48
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993). For a discussion of early behavioral work in the judicial politics subfield see generally NANCY
MAVEETY, THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2003). Behavioralism generally and attitudinalism more
specifically has been critized by other scholars. For a sample of critiques of the attitudinal model, see e.g.,
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton,
Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton
eds.) (2001); FORREST MALTZMAN, ET.AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL
GAME (2000); Richard A. Brisben, Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of the Law in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 1004, 1007 (1996).
49
See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 13 at 65.
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two decades saw the rise of a variety neo-institutional decision making theories 50 as well
as the extensive study of the decision making of courts such as the State Supreme
Courts 51 and the lower federal courts. 52
This new work is important as both the industrial organization of the judicial
branch and its norms and variant institutional rules undoubtedly exert influence upon its
final outcomes. With the wide variety of actors and institutions, the precise trajectory of
American law is difficult, if not impossible, to predict as a host of interactive parameters,
including legal doctrine and partisanship, work to shape the path of American
jurisprudence. Yet, the increasing nuance and diversity 53 of the judicial politics literature
certainly brings scholars closer to understanding the complicated landscape in which
judicial decision making is undertaken.
In addition to all of the aforementioned decisional factors, judicial “peer effects”
are one additional element that received recent study. 54 Of course, it is hardly new or
novel to assert that, in general terms, maintaining high status among one’s peers as well
as sustaining relationships with one’s close colleagues might, together with other factors,
50

See e.g. Rogers Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the 'New Institutionalism,' and the Future of Public Law,
82 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89 (1988) (previewing some of the future development in the public law field); LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); FORREST MALTZMAN, ET. AL., CRAFTING
LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); CORNELL CLAYTON & HOWARD GILLMAN
(EDS) SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (1998). It is important to
note how institutional theories take a variety of flavors including strategic institutionalism and historical
institutionalism. Furthermore, the methods employed by these respective camps range from formal theory
to qualitative historical methods. For an attempt to use qualitative historical methods to support a strategic
account see Daniel Katz, Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior and the Legacy of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States, 22 J. of L. & Pol. 303 (2006).
51
See e.g. F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State
Courts, 33 J. of Legal Stud. 431(2004); Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall & Laura Langer, Placing State
Supreme Courts in State Politics, 1 State Politics & Policy Q. 81 (2001); Donald Songer & Kelly CrewsMeyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 750 (2000);
Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court
Judges, 62 J. of Pol. 387 (2000); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State
Supreme Courts, 54 J. of Pol. 427 (1992); Gregory A. Calderia, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A
Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 178 (1985); Lawrence Friedman, et. al., State
Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 Stan. L Rev. 773 (1981).
52
While there certainly exists important early work on lower courts, recent witnessed substantial amount of
scholarship studying lower courts. See e.g.VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST & WENDY
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON APPELLATE COURT DECISION MAKING
(2006); Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. of Emper. Leg. Stud. 369 (2005);
DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (2002); Susan Haire, Stefanie
Lindquist & Donald Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical
Perspective, 37 L. & Soc. Rev. 143 (2002); DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B.
HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2000); Charles Cameron,
Jeffrey Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy, 94 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 101
(2000); Frank Cross & Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 Yale L. J. 2155 (1998); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A.
Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme
Court—Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 673 (1994).
53
The “logic of diversity” I invoke herein is drawn from the work of Scott Page. See SCOTT PAGE, THE
DIFFERENCE (2007) (explaining the conditions under which diversity can create better public and private
institutions).
54
For an example see Cameron & Cummings supra note 3.
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impact an individual’s decision calculus. Legal formalists, however, long denied such
influence instead arguing judicial decision making was the by product of the
“technocratic application of neutral legal principles.” With respect to crafting law, a
number of important scholars assert a strong role for social factors. Consider Judge
Posner’s book Overcoming Law where he identifies a host of variables that together
define the judicial utility function. 55 Among these core parameters, Judge Posner argues
that a judges’ reputation among his or her fellow judges affects the types of judicial
outputs he or she would be willing to support. 56
Reputational or peer related effects are difficult to operationalize. However, this
has not prevented scholars from developing methodological approaches to measure the
relative prestige and influence of federal judicial actors. 57 While early work on prestige
relied upon ratings by academics and other court observers, 58 recent efforts use more
objective measures to gain leverage on these questions. For example, Landes, Lessig and
Solimine operationalize prestige using the total citations to opinions produced by a given
judge. 59 These scholars support the use of citations as a proxy for prestige and influence
arguing judges who garner high citation counts do so because their brethren either hold
them in high regard or otherwise feel some social obligation to cite the opinion of their
close colleague. 60
Klein and Morrisroe resist this assertion arguing that the raw citations, relied upon
by Landes, Lessig & Solimine, do not adequately capture the question at issue. 61
Namely, “it is not at all clear what citations measure.” 62 For example, raw citations
might capture an entire host of factors unrelated to prestige and influence including panel
assignment, case effects, as well as other stochastic elements. To combat these concerns,
Klein and Morrisoe offered a modified citation analysis—limited to instances where
individual judges are cited by name. They assert “…more prestigious judges should
more often be cited by name and, therefore, citations by name should be a valid indicator
of a judge’s prestige.” 63 The Klein and Morrisroe approach provides a list of ultra
prestigious jurists whose views might be more likely to be followed than less socially
prominent colleagues. 64

55

See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). The chapter on the judicial utility function is based
upon important earlier work. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993).
56
Id.
57
Although largely focused upon the entire circuit, for a helpful discussion of these approaches see
generally Solimine supra note 43.
58
See e.g. ALBERT BLAUSTEIN & ROY MIERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978); Blaustein, Albert Blaustein & Roy Mersky, Rating
Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A. Journal 1183 (1972); Rodney Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 Amer. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 295 (1936) (using rating by academics to analyze the reputations of state supreme courts). For a
more general discussion of the reliance upon qualitative ratings see Gregory Caldeira, In the Mirror of the
Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court, 10 Pol. Behav. 247 (1988).
59
See Landes, Lessig & Solimine supra note 5.
60
Id.
61
Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 5.
62
Id. at 374.
63
Id. at 376.
64
Id. at 381 table 2.
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These lists are important as socially elite opinion regarding what constitutes a
sound legal rule is not static. At the same time, given that the judicial social world
displays significant adherence to particular interpretative approaches, a robust theory of
change, must describe which actors, if any, are disproportionately likely to garner
acceptance from their colleagues. Specifically, at first pass, it would appear no individual
jurist could through his or her mere pronouncement induce acceptance of a given legal
rule by his or her colleagues. Yet, this may depend upon the social position of the actor
making the pronouncement. If certain jurists in the judicial hierarchy possess a greater
level of prestige and influence than their surrounding peers, then only a small number of
diffuse but socially important players would actually be necessary to induce widespread
convergence from their less prominent colleagues. The popular literature calls this
threshold a “tipping point.” 65 In more formal terms, it is the relative measures of social
structure developed within the networks literature which may yield information about the
conditions under which we might observe doctrinal phase transition.
The growing work using the citation methodology provides significant insight
into questions of judicial esteem. 66 Building on the themes of this scholarship, we
believe a mapping of the judicial social landscape, built upon the traffic of law clerks,
should supplements this literature by visualizing the relative position of both individuals
and communities of judicial actors. In the aggregate, our analysis of the social structure
of the federal judiciary yields insight into the path of “peer effects” by providing a
glimpse into the overall network structure of the federal judiciary. While our measures
are partial and do not completely adjudicate all questions, this article, taken together with
the prior citation based scholarship should provide for significant understanding.
B. THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS
Federal judicial clerkships are desirable employment opportunities to which may
law students aspire. For the successful applicant, an elite clerkship provides personal
prestige as well as a series of tangible dividends. 67 In addition to the immediate financial
65

See generally MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2002).
There is a growing domestic and international literature analyzing judicial citations. See e.g. Stephen
Choi & Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges? Paper Presented at
the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, available at
http://law.bepress.com/alea/17th/art61; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court
Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23 (2004); Mita Bhattacharya &
Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the
High Court of Australia, 30 J. of Legal Stud. 223 (2001); Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court Cites the
Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993, 33 Osgoode Hall L. J.
453 (1996). See also supra note 42 and accompanying text. Critiques of citations counts assert the
randomness associated with case assignment as well as other factors, injects stochasticity into the analysis
of citations. Thus, a model merely built upon citation counts arguably paints an incomplete picture of
judicial esteem. We believe that our effort, taken together with the citation count scholarship, should yield
strong insight into the path of information flow and the development of so called “citation clubs.” For a
sample of the critiques of citation analyzes see Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy,
32 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1237 (2005); Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts. in Judgments on
Promotion, Tenure, and. Status, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 829-39 (1993); James Gordon, Cordozo’s Baseball Card,
44 Stan. L. Rev. 899 (1992). For a counter-argument see Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use
of Citations in the Law, 2 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 381 (2000).
67
A series of recent reports note that the bonuses offered by law firms seeking to employ a Supreme Court
Law Clerk now reach as high as $250,000. Taken together with their base salary such individuals can earn
66
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rewards, such positions are serially correlated with advancement in a variety of
hierarchies—including advancement within the legal profession, the legal academy and
in some instances future elevation to the bench. The financial and professional rewards
are not the only attractive elements. Commentators assert that law clerks exert an ever
increasing influence over both the agenda 68 and the substantive content of judicial
outcomes. 69 For a law student or freshly minted lawyer, the opportunity to participate in
the shaping of the law, taken together with the social prestige and labor market dividends,
incentivize a qualified individual to seek such employment.
Following an initial sorting process, including in most cases a personal interview,
a judge may extend an offer to a selected applicant. 70 Such an offer could be extended
immediately following the interview or could come at a future moment. The content of
the offer is exceedingly similar across judges at a given level of the judicial hierarchy. 71
The salary is determined exogenously and “fixed.” 72 As Professor Priest notes, “even
where there are differences across clerkships, their expected value is low because of the

in excess of $400,000. See e.g. David Lat, The Supreme Court’s Bonus Babies, The New York Times, June
18, 2007 (asserting these bonuses are good for the legal system as they incentivize talented young lawyers
to provide service to the Court).
68
See e.g. ARTEMUS WARD AND DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERER’S APRRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CHAPTER 4 &5 (2006); TODD PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF
THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); Barbara
Palmer, The “Bermuda Triangle?” The Cert Pool and Its Influence over the Supreme Court’s Agenda, 18
Const. Commen. 105 (2001); Jan Palmer and Saul Brenner, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations and the
Conference Vote On-the-Merits on the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 Just. Sys. J. 185 (1995);
69
See Ward & Weiden supra note 25; Peppers supra note 25; Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of
Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 281, 302 (1994) (arguing that clerk involvement in opinion drafting “…can
supply all the agenda control that is needed to swing outcomes and rationales in individual cases.”); J.
Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better Or For Worse?, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 321, 339 (1998).
70
While there are important variations in hiring practices, such as the timing of offer, there is also
substantial consistency in approaches. With some limited variation, for those judges who hire permanent
clerks, the basic selection process follows a consistent pattern. Law students or young lawyers submit an
application of materials including their resume, transcripts, writing sample and letters of reference. See
generally Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Rat Race: Insider Advice on Landing Judicial Clerkships, 110 Penn.
St. L. Rev. 835 (2006). As there is significant uncertainty regarding the prospects for placement, it is quite
common for aspirants to submit tens or even hundreds of such applications. Id. at 837 (noting the average
applicant send materials to sixty-five judges but “it is not atypical for a qualified applicant to apply to over
150 judges.”) Id. In a manner similar to other hiring practices, judges, often with the assistance current
clerks) filter the large sea of applicants and contact a selected few for an individual interview. Applicants
as well as judges typically schedule a battery of such interviews. The interview is often a face-to-face
interaction with the judge as well as members of the judge’s staff. Assuming basic intellectual merit, many
judges use the interview to determine whether the individual’s temperament properly interfaces with the
chambers. See generally Id.
71
See e.g. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching
Markets, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 123, 154-55 (2005) ( “Although individual judges will have different
temperaments and will work their clerks more or less intensively, job conditions themselves over a large
range.”)
72
See Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal
Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 793, 799 n. 14 (2001); See Priest supra note 29 at 154 (“Salaries
are fixed, set by Congress.”)
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short tenure of the job.” 73 There is very little range for negotiation over the terms of the
position. Essentially, the offer is dichotomous. 74
While this description of the clerk selection process might appear innocuous, a
substantial amount of recent scholarship argues otherwise. The past two decades
witnessed a burgeoning literature devoted to analyzing both the role of 75 as well as labor
market for federal judicial law clerks. It is this latter commentary regarding clerk hiring
that is most germane to this article. Although not completely attributable to any single
source, Judge Wald’s 1990 essay is the probable origin of recent commentary discussing
the selection mechanism for federal law clerks. 76 Then the Chief Judge of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, she describes the hiring process as undignified and cites others
who characterize it as “frenzied” 77 “ludicrous” 78 and “madcap decisionmaking.” 79
While her essay is a call for reform, she makes some keen observations about the
conditions underlying the nature of the law clerk market.
She observes that an “excellent versus a mediocre team of clerks makes a huge
difference in the judge’s daily life and in her work product.” 80 Thus, judges in part seek
strong clerks as it lightens their workload or allows them to more effectively advance
their vision of the law. As Judge Wald notes, “a judge sometime decides whether to file
a separate opinion or to dissent in a case based—a least in part— upon the support she
can anticipate from her clerks.” 81 In addition to internal administrative motivations,
external reputational considerations also encourage artful hiring practices. In a
commonly quoted sentence, Judge Wald asserts, “[A] judge’s reputation among his own
colleagues may in part reflect his ability to garner the most highly credentialed clerks
under his banner so that he can maintain a reputation as a ‘feeder’ of clerks to the
Supreme Court.” 82
It is the strong demand for ultra competent clerks that in large part fueled the
“frenzied mating ritual.” 83 The process, as described by Wald, includes “short fuse”
offers and “early –bird judges skim[ming] off those applicants with the brightest
credentials.” 84 Despite various efforts to cajole their colleagues to adhere to a consistent
hiring date, reform efforts consistently unraveled. While unraveling alone is a strong
source of concern for Judge Wald, it is the behavior produced by the market for clerks
and its reflection upon the judicial branch that is her greatest concern.85
73

Id.
In other words, it is a zero or one—a take it or leave it offer.
75
For a small slice of this literature see supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
76
See Patricia M.Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 152 (1990).
77
See id. citing David Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N.Y. Times,
March 17, 1989, at B4 col. 1.
78
Id.
79
See Wald supra note 76 citing internal correspondence.
80
Id. at 153.
81
Id. Judge Wald additionally notes “[O]r she may ask for, or beg off, responsibility for a particular
opinion assignment because of the availability or nonavailability of a particular clerk to work on the case.”
Id.
82
Id. at 154.
83
Id. at 152 citing David Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N.Y.
Times, March 17, 1989, at B4, col. 1.
84
Id at 156.
85
Id. at 152. “The law of the reigns and badmouthing, spying and even poaching among judges is rife.” Id.
74
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This early commentary by Judge Wald did not end discussion and instead only
begat further debate about the condition of the clerk market. For example, the following
year witnessed a rejoinder to Judge Wald’s reform agenda offered by Ninth Circuit Judge
Through his 1991 article, the self proclaimed “bad apple”
Alex Kozinski. 86
acknowledged in reaction to “complaints about ‘badmouthing, spying and even poaching
among judges’…we should all try to do better.” 87 Despite this concession, Judge
Kozinski otherwise argued “…there is nothing at all wrong with the current law clerk
selection process; everything is hunky dory.” 88 Instead of reform, he argued “…federal
judges should get off their pedestals and compete….” 89 For Judge Kozinski, reform
proposals simply stymie upstarts by advantaging judges with geography, seniority and
existing high levels of prestige. 90
This first round of commentary, including efforts by the aforementioned jurists as
well as others, 91 brought a variety of unique reform proposals and provided a wealth of
qualitative insight into the state of the law clerk hiring process. The second strand of
“clerk market” scholarship advanced an economic solution. Most notably, economists
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Alvin Roth along with Judge Richard Posner
produced what has been called the Harvard-Chicago analysis of the law clerk market. 92
Using detailed survey data, the Harvard-Chicago study provided extensive, empirical
insight into the experience of judges and clerks in the hiring process. 93 Their data, taken
together with subsequent economic analysis, argued the clerk selection process failed to
maximize “the sum of satisfaction” of judge and clerk match. Namely, the clerk market,
like other markets with timing problems, is plagued with unraveling. Individual judges
have substantial incentive to deviate from agreed hiring dates as the existing regulatory
mechanisms did not impose enforceable timing regulations. 94 Judges who might
otherwise be inclined to abide with a given hiring date are forced to defect from that date
86

Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 Yale L.J. 1707 (1991).
Id. at 1715.
88
Id. at 1707.
89
Id. at 1714.
90
Id. at 1719. “Judges with many years on the bench naturally have an advantage over upstarts like me
who have to work hard at achieving a national reputation. The problem with many reform proposals is that
they tend to reinforce these patterns by decreasing the means by which less-favored clerkships can compete
for desirable applicants.” (emphasis added)
91
With a debate in full force, the years that immediately followed witnessed a number of judges and
commentators entering the fray. For example, Judge Oberberdorfer and his former clerk filed a response to
Judge Kozinski arguing his objections are misplaced and that a medical style matching system would
improve the state of affairs. Louis F. Oberdoerfer & Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to
the Bad Apple, 101 Yale L. J. 1097 (1992). Trenton Norris offered a clerk’s perspective on the discontents
of the current market while Judge Becker, Justice Breyer and Judge Calabresi set forth their “Modest
March 1 solution” to the clerk hiring process. Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi,
The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 Yale L.J. 207
(1994). In the period between crafting and final publication of this article Judge Breyer became Justice
Breyer.
92
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal Judicial
Law Clerks, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 793 (2001).
93
Id. at 796. “A fundamental goal of our project has been to gain an improved understanding of how the
market for federal judicial law clerks actually operates. There are many rumors and opinions about this
market, and few hard facts.” Id.
94
Id.
87
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to avoid the “sucker payoff.” 95 These conditions only cause other individuals to engage
in similar practices until, across the vast majority of participants, there is widespread noncompliance.
Although disagreeing with a number of conclusions of the Harvard-Chicago
study, Professor Priest observes “job conditions are fungible across a large range…even
where there are differences across clerkships, their expected value is low because of the
short tenure of the job.” 96 Since less prestigious judges cannot offer a compensating
wage differential “[T]he timing of offer, thus, becomes a term of trade in the clerkship
market transaction.” 97 Thus, “first movers” such as Judge Kozinski are able to increase
their relative standing through strategic behavior early in their career.
Of course, if timing of offer was the sole sorting mechanism in the clerk market,
the traffic of law clerks might be a poor proxy from which to operationalize the aggregate
social structure. Some portions of the literature, if reviewed in isolation, imply that the
strategic behavior of judges simply overwhelms law clerks and precludes them from
obtaining their optimal match. For example, the Harvard-Chicago data indicates a
majority of respondents who received an offer did so either during or within two days of
their interview. 98 At the same time, judges often expected quick or even immediate
responses to such offers. 99
Given these conditions, clerks face significant pressure to avoid an “exploding”
offer from a less preferred judge. It turns out that a number of clerks, often with
guidance from their professors and law school career services offices, use compensating
techniques to resist a sub-optimal match. For example, Judge Wald notes “savvy clerk
applicants…called chambers in advance to announce that that particular judge was the
first choice.” 100 In addition, strategic scheduling is another important compensating
technique. Strategic schedulers organize their interviews in relationship to their choices
over judges. Specifically, if clerks can schedule interviews in strict association to their
preference ordering, than an exploding offer would not be problematic but rather a
welcome event. 101
C. A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?
The purpose of this article is not to engage the debate over the proper regulatory
mechanism, if any, that should govern the clerk market. The recent hiring moratorium,

95

The Harvard-Chicago study offers a partial solution to the problem of enforceability. They argue “…the
Supreme Court could play an important and productive role in helping to organize and improve the market
for federal law clerks….we have suggested a partial solution, which would require judges who wish their
clerks to be eligible for United States Supreme Court clerkships to enroll in a centralized matching
system…” Id. at 885. The genius of their proposal is how it sanctions the very individuals who are most
inclined to engage in early exploding offers.
96
George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets,
22 Yale J. on Reg. 124, 154 (2005).
97
Id.
98
See Harvard-Chicago supra note 57 at 814 tbl. 1.
99
Id. at 814 tbl. 2.
100
See Wald supra note 76 at 159.
101
See Aldisert et al. supra note 70 at 848 (quoting an unnamed Fifth Circuit judge “If an applicant really
wants a position with a particular judge, he can signal that by offering to do an interview on the first day.”)
Id.
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for example, may limit some the discontents experienced under the prior regime. 102 We
will leave the evaluation of such questions to other scholars. 103 For the purposes of this
article, our interest in law clerks is simply to study and visualize their traffic to gain
insight into questions of inter-judge connectivity. The hiring of clerks is an intimate
act, 104 one where deliberation or forethought should attach. While it is a choice under
uncertainty, a significant number of signals are available. Some signals, such as grade
point average, law review membership or personal background, are intrinsic to the
individual clerk. Other cues come from third parties. As the foregoing analysis is limited
to law clerks which flow between various judicial actors, judges who previously
employed the given clerk provide either an explicit or implicit signal to the subsequent
hiring jurist. In general, judges and communities of jurists who consistently share clerks
probably do so because the receiver either respects the judgment of his or her colleagues
or otherwise shares a social connection with the senders.
Thus, embedded in the immensely interesting literature analyzing the market for
federal law clerks is language and commentary that should be of particular interest to the
larger public law scholarship. Notwithstanding their critiques of the efficiency of a
number of allocative elements of the clerk market, many authors observe it is prestige
which in substantial part motivates both the judges and their would-be apprentices. 105
Consider Judge Wald as quoted earlier 106 and Professor Priest who notes “other things
equal, prominent judges are able to secure the most qualified clerks.” 107 Of course, the
Harvard-Chicago findings counsel some degree of a caution from reliance upon clerk
traffic as an unambiguous instrument for the relative social position of federal judges.
However, even their proposal for reform, centered upon restricting feeding to the United
States Supreme Court, acknowledges that social prestige and influence is attached to the
ability to attract and feed “star” clerks. 108
In all, despite the caveats the literature on the clerk market might impose, there
remains significant information embedded in the market for judicial clerks that should
help inform the greater public law literature. While a simple descriptive account or
tabulation of so called “feeder” judges would certainly demonstrate which individuals
consistently sent their law clerks to the levels above, such analysis fails to characterize
communities and capture concepts such as social position and attraction. While some of
the clerk moves may be wholly unrelated to our question of inquiry, we believe in the
aggregate, the majority of such moves are related to social advancement. On average,
clerks move from judges with a lower social position to those with a higher social
standing. Given the clear labor market payoffs available in the private market, many of
clerks who remain in the network in order to flow between judges often do so in order to
102

For an analysis of the effects of the hiring moratorium see Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard
A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The New Market for Federal Law Clerks, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 447 (2007).
103
See generally Id.
104
See Wald supra note 76 at 153 (arguing “[T]he judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually
dependant one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair.”) Id.
105
The term “sorcerers’ apprentice” is borrowed from a recent book on Supreme Court Law Clerks. See
ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES : 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006).
106
See Wald supra note 76 at 153.
107
Id. at 162.
108
See Avery supra note 92.
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increase their personal position. 109 In the face of significant opportunity costs for
remaining a public employee, clerks are voting with their feet and their traffic,
particularly in the aggregate, says something important.
III. FOLLOWING THE EIGENVECTOR: THE VISUALIZATION OF A DECADE OF FEDERAL LAW
CLERK TRAFFIC
Inspired by our desire to better understand the impact of “peer effects,” we used
the tools of social network analysis to visualize the social architecture of the federal
judiciary. To build the connections between actors, we painstakingly collected a
decade’s worth of federal law clerk information and used this data to visualize the flow of
clerks between judges. Bolstered by subsequent analytics, our visualizations yield some
interesting findings. First, while the notion of a “feeder judge” is commonly invoked,
this study visualizes the concept. Visualization displays a host of secondary movers who
“feed” the feeders thereby increasing their centrality within the network. The overall
structure of the network, shown in Figures 1-4 infra, is also intriguing. Despite the
presence of clear cliques or communities, the center of the network is dense and clustered
enough to keep interconnected most of the members of the federal judiciary. 110
A. DATA COLLECTION: SOURCES AND APPROACH
With the assistance of our research team 111 , we collected available information
for every federal law clerk employed by an Article III judge during the “natural”
Rehnquist Court (1995-2004). This process proved challenging as no particular data
source contained a complete listing of such information. However, our data set combines
a diverse set of sources and reflects nearly all law clerks at all levels for the relevant
years. 112
Given its extensive treatment, we began our effort by consulting The Judicial
Yellow Book published by Leadership Directories, Inc. This tri-annual serial publication
contains extensive biographic information on virtually every state and federal judge in the
United States. Included within this broad range of information are the names, and in
most cases, educational history of various members of the judges’ chambers. Using the
fall edition in each year, our team transcribed all available identifying information
109

At least some number of clerks who remain and move from the Federal Circuit Court to the Federal
District Court may do so in order to offer potential employers a better portfolio of experience. We thank
Owen Jones for bringing this point to our attention. In fact, it is also possible that clerks who move
downward in the hierarchy may do so in order to work in geographic locations that they consider more
attractive. Recognizing this caveat, we still believe that as a clerk searches for an additional clerkship,
imposing whatever limiting parameters he or she chooses, that to the extent the individual selects among
judges prestige is an important part of the decisional calculus.
110
Figures 1-4 displayed infra do not contain every member of the federal judiciary. Although more than
five hundred members are present, the visualizations omit judges who over the decade long period failed to
send a single clerk to another federal judge.
111
We would be remiss if we did not take the opportunity to thank Eric Provins, Steven Schwartz, Courtney
O’Brien, Pamela Kiel, Stephen Janos, Eitan Ingall, Daniel Schwartz, Art Reyes, Jon Tshiamala, Alex
Hughes, Noah Korn, Neil Tambe, Nicole Tyrna, Erin Copland, Matthew Smith, Darin Goldstein, Alex
Satanovsky, Benjamin Ruano and Alex Karpowitz for their assistance with data coding.
112
By our best estimate, our data collection effort yielded approximately 97% of all law clerk events during
the decade long period.
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including the clerk’s full name, educational background and year of service. Across the
decade long period, this process yielded a significant amount of the desired data.
Despite the extensive amount of information contained in The Judicial Yellow
Book, our primary data collection effort left a non-trivial number of “missing” clerk
values. In order to bolster the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we searched and filled
missing values using The Judicial Staff Directory produced by CQ Press. This second
level was largely successful and moved the dataset near completion. Yet, as we reviewed
the totality of the dataset, it was clear that the set still contained some systematic bias
with a large number of the missing values drawn from a discrete number of judges. In
order to obtain these public but otherwise unavailable “clerk values,” our team searched
for missing clerk values using MartinDale-Hubbell as well as the websites of various
prominent law firms. To the extent the sum of these combined efforts also proved
unavailing, we contacted both the judge’s former law clerks as well as the career services
offices at a number of law schools located near the particular judge’s chambers.
In sum, while the dataset does not contain every discrete clerk value, the Katz,
Stafford & Provins dataset (hereinafter KSP) reflects all currently available law clerk
information for a decade long period. Appendix I displays some sample lines of code
drawn from the KSP dataset. As displayed infra, a given line of code contains not only
the clerk’s full name but also the clerk’s educational background, year of service and the
judge’s name. 113 Furthermore, in order to link our set to existing data sources and to aid
in future research, each “clerk event” reflected as an individual line of code contains
judge identification and seat numbers drawn from the Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow &
Gerard S. Gryski Attributes of Federal Court Judges datasets. 114
A complete version of the KSP dataset contains in excess of 25,000 law clerk
events drawn from not only every Article III judge but also Article I Bankruptcy Court
Judges. As the available data sources maintain the greatest degree of accuracy for the
law clerks of non-senior status Article III judges, 115 we restricted our analysis herein to
these jurists. Even with the clerks of Bankruptcy and Senior Status Judges removed, the
dataset does not suffer from a want of information. Namely, the remaining dataset, as
restricted, still contains nearly 20,000 total law clerk events for the decade long period.
These events are distributed across the federal judicial hierarchy with the majority of
clerk events attributed to Federal District Courts.
Many of the clerks who appear in our dataset occupy exactly one line of code.
These individuals typically are employed by a judge immediately following law school
and exit the clerk network at the completion of their discrete term. So called
113

For an example of the information contained in this dataset see Appendix I infra.
The Zuk dataset is housed at the University of Kentucky Political Science Department under the
umbrella of a Center named for Judicial Behavioralist S. Sidney Ulmer. The page contains both the
District and Circuit court datasets. See http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/databases.htm
115
For a detailed discussion of senior judges including a claim that Senior Judges are unconstitutional see
David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 Corn. L. Rev. 453 (2007).
“Senior judges are the product of a patchwork of several statutes governing judicial retirement, the most
significant of which is 28 U.S.C § 371. Federal judges become eligible for retirement benefits upon
satisfying the “Rule of Eighty”—when the sum of their age and years of service on the federal bench
reaches eighty. At that point, the judge has two retirement options: outright retirement, which for
the sake of clarity we will call ‘resignation,’ and the form of semiretirement known as ‘senior status.’” Id.
at 460.
114
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“permanent” law clerks reflect another subset of individuals in the KSP dataset. These
clerks reflect multiple lines of code because they are employed by one individual judge
over a number of years. Our analysis is not directly focused upon either of these
subgroups. Instead, it is directed at clerks who flow between judges.
To find clerk “movers,” we sorted the dataset by clerkname and then by year.
This displayed clusters of individual clerk names. Using limiting properties such middle
initial, law school and undergraduate institution, 116 we differentiated cases involving
similar names. To qualify as a clerk move, an individual employed in a given period
must be hired by a different judge in a subsequent period. As such, it requires two lines
of code to qualify as a clerk move. While we placed no precise limitation upon the
timing of the subsequent interval, the vast majority of the clerk moves involved transfers
in the year immediately following the first clerkship.
From our nearly 20,000 clerk events, we detected nearly nine hundred
movements. As our analysis is exceedingly conservative in it willingness to validate a
“mover,” the number of connections present in the true population likely exceeds the
connections in our visualization of the social landscape. To execute the visualizations
and craft the corresponding network statistics, we converted the lines of code
representing “movers” into connections between judges. For example, if law clerk
Doe_John moved between Judge A and Judge B, than we tallied a connection between
those two jurists. Of the close to nine hundred total connections more than five hundred
represented discrete movers. In other words, the repeated connections, concentrated on a
very limited number of judicial actors. We entered this final dataset of clerk connections
into Guess and Pajek 117 which produced the visualizations and statistics contained in
infra Figures 1-4.
B. THE VISUALIZATION OF LAW CLERK TRAFFIC 1995-2004
After sorting the data, our analysis produced 558 nodes and close to 900 edges.
Drawing a network of this size in a consistent and unbiased manner would be rather
implausible without the aid of a computer based automated drawing programs. The
automated drawing procedures also accelerate the process and provide better clarity,
transparency and replicability. The two automated drawing models used in this paper,
Kamada-Kawai and Fruchterman-Reingold, are spring-embedded, force-directed
placement algorithms. Although the technical characterization is discussed further in
Appendix II, an analogy may help characterize the drawing process.
Imagine that the judge nodes are steel rings that have opposing magnetic charges
and thus work to repel one another. Now visualize springs connecting the steel rings as
the edges in the network. The longer a spring must stretch to connect the steel rings, the
more energy is required to stretch that spring. The closer the position of rings without
connections is to one another, the greater required energy to hold those positions. 118 The
aforementioned algorithms seek to minimize the energy required to balance these
attracting and repelling forces. After applying either Kamada-Kawai or Fruchterman116

We relied upon these values this cell to the extent available. For example, most of the law school
information was available while much of the undergraduate institutional information was unavailable.
117
Guess and Pajek are computer programs used by network scholars to visualize network and run various
network statistics.
118
Peter Eades, A Heuristic for Graph Drawing, 42 Congressus Numerantium 149 (1984).
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Reingold, the result is a graph that generally distributes vertices evenly, minimizes edge
crossings, uses the planar area, reflects inherent symmetry, and minimizes differences in
edge lengths. 119
The mathematical difference between Kamada-Kawai and Fruchterman-Reingold
lie in their calculation of the optimal distance for edge length, interpretation of Hooke’s
Law 120 and the time iterations until the automated drawings cease. 121 In terms of
visualization, Fruchterman-Reingold tends to increase the difficulty of remaining in the
center, pushing less connected nodes to an orbit with a larger circumference.
Nevertheless, in overall structure and clustering, no substantive difference exists. Some
network scholars believe the choice of algorithms should be determined by the size and
density of the graph, and recommend 500 nodes as a rather noisy line of demarcation. 122
Since the federal judicial network is just over 500 nodes, we included visualizations of
both types of automated drawing. While the Kamada-Kawai energizing algorithm
provides a nice visual of the overall structure of the network, the Fruchterman-Reingold
automated drawing provides greater clarity of the interconnectedness of the network’s
center.
With this introduction, consider the foregoing series of networks visualizations.
Figure 1 and 3 uses the Kamada-Kawai algorithms while Figures 2 and 4 employ
Fruchterman-Reingold. Figures 1 & 3 provide a wide view of the energized network
while Figures 2 and 4 provide a close-up view including of the network’s core. A careful
review of the Supreme Court justices displays a familiar ideological distribution. As this
effort is primarily directed at classifying social structure and differentiating among lower
court judges, what is a greater interest are the communities of both circuit and district
court judges who cluster around and feed these Justices. These visualizations do not
follow the typical x and y axis and as such can be rotated. For ease, we rotated the
foregoing figures so as to hold the traditional left to right ideological distribution. 123

119

Thomas M. J. Fruchterman & Edward M. Reingold, Graph Drawing by Force-Directed Placement, 21
Software Practice and Experience 1129 (1991).
120
Mark Newman, Power laws, Pareto distributions and Zipf's law, 46 Contemporary Physics 323 (2005).
121
See Fruchterman & Reingold supra note 119.
122
See WOUTER DE NOOY, ANDREJ MRVAR & VLADIMIR BATAGELJ, EXPLORATORY NETWORK ANALYSIS
WITH PAJEK, 17 (2005).
123
If the graphics were rotated 180°, the relative positions of the nodes would remain unchanged. Rather,
the Supreme Court Justices would simply be distributed North to South rather than East and West.
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FIGURE 1: A WIDE VIEW OF THE KAMADA KAWAI ENERGIZED NETWORK

FIGURE 2: A WIDE VIEW OF THE FRUCHTERMAN REINGOLD NETWORK
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FIGURE 3: A CLOSE VIEW OF THE KAMADA KAWAI ENERGIZED NETWORK
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FIGURE 4: A CLOSE VIEW OF THE FRUCHTERMAN-REINGOLD ENERGIZED NETWORK
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C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDICIAL SOCIAL NETWORK
In network analysis, after the energizing algorithm is applied, the difference
between center and periphery can have different meanings depending upon the
operationalization of the edges and nodes, and the overall structure of the network. In the
judicial network, we have a densely connected center with clusters around the Supreme
Court justices. The circuit and occasional district judges in these clusters frequently send
clerks to the same member of the Supreme Court or to an ideological bundle of judges or
justices. However, occasionally, a lower court judge sends a clerk across these clusters.
These core feeders are sometimes supplied with clerks from surrounding circuit or district
judges. The energizing algorithms push judges to the periphery based in part on the
number of degrees of separation from both the feeders as well as the Supreme Court
justices.
Although the formal institutional authority of each federal judge is nearly
identical for holding the circuit/district distinction, surely the informal prestige and
influence of every judge is not equal. Given this analysis, do we believe the judges
clustered around the Supreme Court are influentially equivalent to the judges on the
margins of the network? Are all Circuit Court Judges as equally influential as say
Merrick Garland, Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Alex Kozinski, Michael Luttig, Michael
Boudin or Richard Posner? After operationalizing connections based on micro decisions
by both the clerks and the receiving judges, we believe that centrality in this judicial
network, in the aggregate, is a rough proxy for judicial esteem.
Considering the Fruchterman-Reingold automated drawing tends to spread nodes
around the periphery in relatively small networks, when speaking about the overall
structure of the judicial network, we will refer to the Kamada-Kawai energized network.
In each network visual, we have included a partition for the formal distinctions between
district, circuit and Supreme Court judges. We might expect the district court judges to
fill the space near the outer rim of the network and seldom spread into the center. Yet,
District Court judges are diffused throughout the network, including a few judges who
find themselves in close proximity to or in the core of the network. The concentration of
district judges does appear to decrease from the periphery to the center. The Circuit
judges are also dispersed throughout the network and are densely concentrated in the
center. Despite egalitarian institutional authority, certain agents have emerged as
informal forces. This broad distribution of judges, both circuit and district, argues that
while institutional authority is a valid and important component for the study of the
judicial decision making an legal change, we also need to consider informal authority and
social structure.
D. THE POWER LAW PROPERTIES OF THE JUDICIAL DEGREE DISTRIBUTION
These visualizations provide insight into the nature of informal authority in the
federal judiciary hierarchy. Figures 3 and 4 display micro-level communities of jurists
linked to each other through their law clerks. While the general composition of these
subgroups might be of little surprise to many court scholars 124 , some interesting actors do

124

It is likely of little surprise to observe prolific Judges such as the Honorable Richard Posner, Harry T.
Edwards, Samuel Alito, Merrick Garland, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Michael Luttig, Guido Calabresi located in
the core of the network.
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find themselves located within the core of the network. 125 Furthermore, as noted above, a
select number of centrally located jurists act to bridge communities thereby maintaining a
fairly high degree of connectivity across these sub-groups.
In broad stroke, one manner to classify the overall structure of a network is to
tally the number of connections or “degrees” between the actors and determine the
distribution of such connections. With respect to such a distribution, there exist many
potential states of the world. For example, the relative distribution could be fairly
uniform—with a wide number of actors possessing a moderate level of degrees. The
degrees could be distributed normally or alternatively could be centered upon a small
number of socially prominent actors. The degree distribution in this judicial network
clearly has heavy tails.
The “top-heavy” or “fat tails” distributions normally refer to three specific
probability density functions: the exponential, the power law, and log-linear. 126
125

Of greatest note are the District Court Judges located close to the core of the network. Included among
them is Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of New York. In late 2007, Judge Mukasey was
confirmed as the Eighty-First Attorney General of the United States.
126
A Power Law, Exponential, and Log-Normal Distributions are generated by the following equations
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value varies inversely linearly with the power of that value. Often any distribution that meets this criterion
is said to be a power law. See Aaron Clauset, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, & M. E. J. Newman, Power-Laws
Distributions in Empirical Data, available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0706/0706.1062v1.pdf
(last visited January 4th, 2008). To then demonstrate the function was a power law, scientists used to create
a histogram of the frequencies then log the x and y-axis then look for the negative linear relationship, and if
the slope of that line was between -2 and -3, the distribution was called a power law, and the slope termed
Alpha. See David C. Roberts & Donald L. Turcotte, Fractality and Self-Organized Criticality of Wars, 6
Fractals 351 (1998); Felisa A. Smith, Body Mass of Late Quaternary Mammals, 84 Ecology 3403 (2003);
Takashi Ito, et. al., Toward a Protein-Protein Interaction Map of the Budding Yeast: A Comprehensive
System to Examine Two-Hybrid Interactions in All Possible Combinations between the Yeast Proteins, 97
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1143 (2000); Newman supra note 120. The Alpha for
our line is -2.3, placing out distribution fairly centered in the acceptable Alpha interval for a power law.
Then to calculate the statistical likelihood of that distribution being a power law, the least squares
estimators were then applied to the log/log plots any the coinciding p-values then illustrated the likelihood
of the distributions. Unfortunately, the least squares parameter estimates are systematically biased because
of the large fluctuations in the tails of each of this probability functions. In other words, noise or variation
in the few observations in the tail disproportionately affects error estimates.
As the included functions indicate, different processes are responsible for these distributions.
Recently, a new technique, derived from maximum likelihood estimators and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic, has emerged to differentiate between these probability distribution functions. See generally
WILLIAM H. PRESS, NUMERICAL RECIPES IN C: THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING (1992); INDRA
CHAKRAVARTI, ET. AL., HANDBOOK OF METHODS OF APPLIED STATISTICS, VOLUME I (1967). The statistic
requires much larger sample sizes and orders of magnitude greater in degree variation than our sample
contains to adjudicate which function is responsible for our observed frequency distribution. However,
differentiating between the exponential, power law, and log-normal distributions is not necessary for our
later claims about phase transitions and self-organized criticality as all three heavy-tailed functions would
suffice. Nevertheless, we are prepared to claim that based on the inversely logarithmic relationship and 2.3 alpha, we are prepared to claim our distribution is most consistent with a power law distribution, but
could be one of the other non-linear fat-tailed or top-heavy distributions produced by exponential or lognormal probability functions.
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Differentiating between the different probability functions is relatively difficult because
of the small number of orders of magnitude within our sample population. The parameter
estimates for the distribution also increase in difficulty because degree distribution is a
discrete variable.
Specifically, many such distributions of “degrees” track the power law
distribution or display power law properties. Power Law distributed phenomena appear
in studies throughout many disciplines including physics, biology, astronomy, finance
and computer science. In renowned physicist Mark Newman’s words, “When the
probability of measuring a particular value of some quantity varies inversely as a power
of that value, the quantity is said to follow a power law.” 127 Thus, the normal manner in
which people test for power law distributions is to construct a frequency distribution plot
and look for the L shape, then log the x and y-axes to see a straight line.
One difficulty associated with accurately asserting that given phenomena are
power law generated is the noise in the tail of the distribution. Specifically, given the
nature of inverse exponentials in the tail of the distribution, the number of observations in
the tail is likely to be very small.
In Figure 5, the frequency distribution plot of the number of judges by the degree
of each judge (the degree is simply the measure of how many edges are incident with
each node), the familiar L-shaped curve emerges. Within the frequency plot, we included
the both separate and aggregate plots for the district and the circuit courts separately and
aggregated. The Supreme Court justices are excluded from the analysis because their
structural position relative to degree distribution is a construct of their institutional
position. Each year, each justice accepts a defined number of clerks, virtually all of
whom have served as a clerk for one of their lower court colleagues. 128 In the log/log
graph, the inverse line is apparent but obviously noisy. The noise in this graph prevents
us from definitively concluding that judicial degree is distributed as a power law. Yet,
considering the relatively small number of observations comparable to the AOL example,
at a minimum, we can conclude the judge degree distribution is consistent with a power
law.

127

See Newman supra note 120.
In the period 1995-2004, we find that nearly 99% of the Supreme Court law clerks were drawn from
lower courts. Professor W. William Hodes, Law Clerk to Justice Ginsburg during the 1996 term,
represents a rare exception to this global trend. A former student of Justice Ginsburg from her service as a
law professor at Rutgers, Mr. Hodes served as her law clerk without first serving for a lower court judge.
Other exceptions include individuals such as Rachael L. Brand who clerked for the Honorable Charles
Fried of the Massachusetts Supreme Court prior to her service to Justice Kennedy and Adam M. Samaha
who clerked for the Honorable Alexander Keith of the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to clerking for
Justice Stevens.
128
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FIGURE 5: THE POWER LAW PROPERTIES OF LAW CLERK TRAFFIC
Log/Log Graph of Degree Distributions
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Figure 5 reinforces our claim that the degree of federal judges is consistent with a
power law distribution. We have excluded the Supreme Court Justices from the analysis
for previously stated reasons. Although the district and circuit partitions may be of
individual interest, the frequency distribution of the aggregated judicial levels provides
the most useful information about the entirety of the interactions. For instance, in the
“aggregate” column, there is an exponential decline of degree frequency over the first six
degree classifications.
Table 1 below provides rather stark evidence regarding the concentration of
degree distribution in the tail. Only 3.42% of the judges have six or greater incident
lines. Those twenty-five judges account for 33.58% of the total connections. The fifteen
judges or 1.28% of the population, that has a degree greater than ten are responsible for
19.27% of the connections. Again, while we cannot definitively conclude that the
frequency distribution of clerk movements perfectly mirrors the power law, Table 1
displays the many of properties of the power law.
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If our micro-level clerk movements both from the perspectives of the clerk and
receiving judge were successful in at least partially operationalizing professional
relationships and prestige, then having a degree distribution that follows a power law is
substantively interesting for both our conclusions about the role “peer effects” of the
federal judiciary and their relationship to theories of legal change. Namely, Professor
Newman demonstrates that the two most likely causes of power law distributions are
Yule’s Law and Self-Organized Criticality—causes that need not be mutually
exclusive. 129
Yule’s Law describes a process where the function generating the distribution
builds upon itself. 130 In reduced form, a common example displaying this mechanism is
the so-called “rich get richer” phenomena. When the percentage of return an individual
investor receives is positively related the quantity of money that person is able to invest
than those with large initial endowments are able to extend their relative advantage over
those at a lower initial starting investment. Essentially, Yule’s law is saying that history
matters. How wealthy you are today is a function of how wealthy you were yesterday.
It seems likely that social or professional influence may in part manifest or grow
in this manner. The more highly respected a colleague the greater the probability that
two people with the same view of that colleague interact and share their opinions. These
conversations would then reinforce their original assessments while possibly informing
the opinions of present third parties, which would then increase that initial probability for
secondary interactions. As such, following Yule’s Law a relatively small number of
129
130

See Newman supra note 120.
Id.
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agents occupy vastly disproportionate influence in the system and play an important role
in generating phase transitions. Table 1, again, provides evidence that the judicial
network exhibits these properties.
“Self-Organized Criticality” describes how dynamic complex systems tend to
arrange over time at the precipice for great change. 131 In 1987 at Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Ken Weisenfeld decided to play a game with a
hypothetical sand pile. Imagine randomly dropping sand onto a flat surface one grain at a
time. Eventually a pile will form. The pile will start flat, and with time will grow
steeper. Except, at irregular intervals avalanches occur and flatten the base of the sand
pile, which will then grow again. By moving their game into computer simulations, Per
Bak and colleagues kept track of the size of the avalanches in terms of the number of
grains that move, and found that there was no typical or average size of an avalanche
because the avalanche sizes followed a power law and not a normal distribution.
Although the most frequent avalanches involved a single grain or two, the avalanche
could also encompass a thousand or ten, and sometimes millions of grains that would
restructure the entire sand pile. At first it seemed that virtually any avalanche would
occur at any time.
Nevertheless, certain trends became evident. Obviously, the steeper the angle of
the sand pile and the greater the amount of sand, the more likely a catastrophic avalanche
would form. To better illustrate the game, Bak and colleagues then changed the angle of
viewing the game so it was as though a person was standing directly over the sand pile,
and shaded the pile according to steepness. As the angle increased the computer shaded
the hill red to indicate a critical state. When the pile was at a greater equilibrium and less
likely to be subject to greater avalanches, the computer shaded the pile green. The piles
would begin green, then gradually shade red until an avalanche or several would settle
the pile, only to provide a larger base for the next pile to form. As the number of grains
increased, so too would the number of red spots. If a grain were to fall on the green
plateaus, the likelihood of a cataclysmic avalanche was small, but if that same grain were
to fall near the bright red peak, an avalanche could spread to other peaks flattening the
entire pile. The sand pile would eventually jettison relatively stable equilibriums and
organize itself at points of criticality, on the brink of great change. Although Bak and
colleagues demonstrated that that each grain of sand regardless of where it falls may or
may not cause an avalanche, and avalanche will not have a typical style thus making
predictive properties impossible, perhaps seeing multiple red peaks in close proximity,
may inform us the likelihood of a catastrophic avalanche is greater than when the pile
appears to be a gentle shade of green.
Forest fires provide another potentially illuminating example. 132 Consider a
single tree in an empty field. The likelihood this first tree will reproduce is dependent
upon the surrounding conditions. A seedling will grow best with more access to sun and
thus the more trees which surround the original tree the lower the probability for
reproduction. In an open field, the original tree should be able to reproduce in multiple
directions, and that tree’s offspring so too should be able to reproduce in certain
directions until the field is full.
131

See PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996).
See Barbara Drossel & Franz Schwabl, Self-Organized Critical Forest-Fire Model, 69 Phys. Rev. Lett.
1629 (1992).
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As the density of the field increases to its carrying capacity, the trees will begin
competing for scarce resources, including light, soil, minerals and of course water. As a
byproduct of this competition, both the field and the tree become drier. If the
environment should reach a critical point, a lightning strike or a random variation in
temperature will start a fire. It is tempting to assert that this fire spreads randomly.
However, since the fire needs trees for fuel, it will spread as the trees have spread. Thus,
the manner in which the trees of the forest self-organized directs the very conditions for
the fire to spread across the field. The cycle from barren field to forest to conflagration
back to barren field is a type of phase transition. As with most complex systems,
prediction of either the path of the fire or the ideological change is impossible with such
limited information, but as information increases, the model can generate more consistent
and precise conclusions. What is the initial position of the fire? In what direction and
with what magnitude is the wind blowing? What are the burn rates for different trees?
Where is the water located? What are the physical boundaries?
As noted above, the causal mechanisms for power law distributions are not
mutually exclusive. If complex systems self-arrange at positions on the precipice of great
change, Yule’s Law seems like a possible source for the degree distribution in the federal
judicial network. We might assume that a phase transition is less likely to occur when
that conversion requires the mobilization of a large proportion of actors. Accordingly, if
power, formal and informal, is concentrated in a few nodes, each capable of influencing
their communities, which can influence and in turn other communities, then that system
is at a point of conversion. If the process that creates the concentration of power is such
that the more influence an agent possesses the more influence that actor can acquire, then
Yule’s Law may very well be the process through which a system self-organizes at
positions of criticality.
IV. FROM MICRO TO MACRO AND BACK AGAIN: PEER EFFECTS, EMERGENCE AND
CONVERGENCE IN A FEDERAL JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
Whether the actors in the federal judiciary self-organize at positions of criticality,
follow Yule’s law or display some element of both, our study helps at least partially
inform the conditions for doctrinal phase transition. Just as knowledge of the position of
trees throughout the field provides greater understanding of how the fire spreads, so to,
various theories of legal change will be better informed by understanding the relative
social position of various actors in judicial hierarchy. Whether invoking illusions to
fireflies, sand piles or automobile traffic the overall goal of this endeavor is to illuminate
the discussion of judicial “peer effects.” Namely, while there are important properties
drawn from each major judicial decision making theory, better understanding of the
manner in which social factors structure the global outputs for the federal judicial
hierarchy is arguably needed.
Judicial decision making is decision making in a hierarchy. Across all the actors
and opinions, particularly those produced by lower courts, understanding why certain
individuals and cases are privileged is a non-trivial enterprise. An important precursor to
gaining leverage on these “peer effects” is characterizing the social structure in which
actors operate. Following on Judge Posner’s discussion of “reputation,” as well as other
literature discussing prestige and influence literature, it is difficult to deny a role for
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social factors. Simply put, social factors “matter” and as such the federal judiciary is
simultaneously marked by both emergent and convergent behaviors. Despite the
widespread agreement, within the bounded range of legal discourse, there are still periods
of legal change where the rise of new interpretative approaches is almost certainly
supported by structurally important actors who champion a particular legal rule.
In all, despite the sorting issues associated with the law clerk market, we believe
the traffic of law clerks provides significant insight into the relative clout actors in a
judicial hierarchy. Namely, existing methods relying exclusively upon citation counts or
subjective evaluations certainly furthered collective understanding about questions of
social stature. However, these approaches did not bring complete closure to the debate.
While we recognize that this article also does not completely adjudicate all open
questions, it builds upon this earlier work by offering a graph theoretic approach to
formalize discussion of concepts such as social position and social structure.
A significant number of individual-level theories of judicial decision making—
including behavioral and strategic theories—purport to provide a complete view of
judicial decision making. Other scholarship such as those offered by the historical
institutionalists, emphasizes the Court’s constitutive features and challenges strategic
theories arguing the macro patterns of judicial decisions are inconsistent with observed
macro-level judicial outputs. Our emphasis on judicial “peer effects” is an attempt to fill
the void in these respective theories by arguing the existing social structure of the
hierarchical federal judiciary in part explains how an existing set of individual
mircomotives map to the aggregate macro-behavioral judicial outcomes. 133 Namely,
while partisan policy preferences, strategic and other considerations are certainly
important—so too are social factors. If judicial decision making is in part socially
constituted than consider this an investigation of the relevant architecture. Scaffolding
comes in a variety of flavors and different structures consequence outcomes in different
manners. As such, we believe the public law literature should embrace a variety of
complex systems based approaches including but not limited to network analysis.

133

See Shelling supra note 16.
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APPENDIX I: A Sample from the Katz, Stafford, Provins Law Clerk Dataset
Year

Clerk Name

Undergraduate

Law School

Judge Name

Id

Seat No.

1995

Yoo_Christopher_S

Harvard

Northwestern

Randolph_A_Raymond

12109

DC.09.03

1995

Metzger_Gillian_E

Yale

Columbia

Wald_Patricia_M

18260

DC.11.01

2000

Van_Houwelling_Molly_S

Michigan

Harvard

Boudin_Michael

22750

01.01.08

2000

Seinfeld_Gil

Harvard

Harvard

Calabresi_Guido

23155

02.03.09

2000

Stras_David

Kansas

Kansas

Luttig_J_Michael

22225

04.13.01

2002

Prescott_J_J

Stanford

Harvard

Garland_Merrick_B

30168

DC.10.02

1998

Tushnet_Rebecca_L

Harvard

Yale

Becker_Edward_R

590

03.09.03

1996

Gulati_Mitu

Chicago

Harvard

Alito_Samuel_A

127

03.04.05

1998

Zearfoss_Sarah

Bryn_Mawr

Michigan

Ryan_James_L

13110

06.05.04

2000

Milani_Anup

Georgetown

Chicago

Williams_Stephen_F

20460

DC.01.09

APPENDIX II: From a Ring Lattice to an Energized Network
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The above visual is a useful depiction of how the energizing algorithms processes
the information contained in the network file to produce the visual depiction of the
network contained in this study. Stage 1 is a picture of how Pajek initially registers the
information. This is a circular network, in which the program begins at nine o’clock on
the circle with the first node entered into the network data file. Each node in order listed
in the data file then follows the original node moving clockwise around the circle. Once
all of the nodes are aligned around the circle, the program allots the connections from the
data file drawing lines between the nodes. Obviously, Stage 1 is not a useful
visualization.
Stage 2 represents the early stage of the Kamada-Kawai spreading algorithm:
certain nodes based on their centrality are being fixed in the center, nodes that are
connected attract one another and those that are not repel. The nodes with higher degrees
immediately move to the center. Parts of the graph have maintained the initial circular
structure, but the graph is flux and begins to spread. In Stage 3, the graph no longer
circular, but the connections appear long and are thus strained according to Hooke’s Law.
In Stage 4, the graph has reached equilibrium, the connection length is balanced between
the forces that attract and repel. Stage 4 is the Kamada-Kawai energized network used in
visualizations.
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